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* Class of 2015, University of New Mexico School of Law. Thank you to
Professor David Stout, for distilling the Tort Claims Act, and to my wife, Danila, for
your ongoing support of my academic endeavors.
1. NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-1–30 (1976, as amended through 1991).
2. NMSA 1978, § 41-4-11(B)(1) (“The liability for which immunity has been
waived pursuant to Subsection A of this section shall not include liability for damages
caused by: (1) a defect in plan or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway,
street, alley, sidewalk or parking area[.]”).
3. NMSA 1978, § 41-4-11(A) (“The immunity granted . . . does not apply to liability for damages . . . caused by the negligence of public employees while acting
within the scope of their duties during the construction, and in subsequent maintenance of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking
area.”).
4. See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.

35097-nmx_44-2 Sheet No. 119 Side A

Under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (“Tort Claims Act”),1 governmental entities are immune from claims for damages related to design
attributes of highways.2 Conversely, the Act waives governmental immunity from damages caused by negligent construction and maintenance of
highways, but retains immunity for highway design.3 Thus, in public roadway liability cases against governmental entities, the question is where
design ends and maintenance begins in determining whether the government should be held liable for injuries that occur on roads it builds. Because the New Mexico legislature has declined to define “maintenance,”4
New Mexico courts have developed a common law inquiry into whether
or not a dangerous condition is caused by design or maintenance of a
road. As part of this inquiry, courts in New Mexico have required the
plaintiff to show that the government was on notice of a dangerous condition before imposing a maintenance duty on governmental entities.
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In Martinez v. New Mexico Department of Transportation,5 the New
Mexico Supreme Court dealt with two questions related to negligent
maintenance. First, the court revisited the distinction between highway
design and highway maintenance within the context of traffic control device placement under the Tort Claims Act. The court also addressed a
second question: what constitutes notice of a dangerous condition on
New Mexico roadways? With each issue the supreme court addressed a
divergence by a lower court from precedent. As such, potential justifications for these deviations (rejected by the supreme court) are offered as
part of the analysis.
This note analyzes both issues before the New Mexico Supreme
Court in Martinez. Part I provides background information related to the
facts of the case and procedural history. Part II examines how the court
addressed the court of appeals’ deviation in Martinez from the accepted
judicial interpretation of maintenance. Part III examines the New Mexico
standard for admissibility of evidence intended to prove actual or constructive notice on the part of a governmental entity.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2013-NMSC-005, 296 P.3d 468.
Martinez v. New Mexico Dept. of Transp., 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 2, 296 P.3d 468.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 3.
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On December 9, 2004, Amelia Martinez and Donald Espinoza were
driving westbound towards Los Alamos on New Mexico State Road 502
(“NM 502”).6 At that time, Anthony Griego was driving eastbound (away
from Los Alamos) on NM 502.7 At the time of the accident, red crushed
cinder, placed on NM 502 by the New Mexico Department of Transportation (“NMDOT”) to mitigate snowy or icy conditions on the road, was
present in the center turn-only lane.8 As both vehicles approached mile
marker 9, Mr. Griego entered the center turn-only lane between eastbound and westbound traffic, lost control of his vehicle, and collided
head-on with decedents’ vehicle.9 All parties involved were killed in the
collision.10 Ms. Martinez was eight and a half months pregnant at the time
of the accident.11 Her unborn child did not survive.12
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NM 502 is a “winding, mountainous roadway leading to and from
Los Alamos.”13 Due to increased traffic flow, NMDOT redesigned NM
502 in the late 1980s.14 As part of the redesign, NMDOT constructed concrete “jersey barriers”15 between eastbound and westbound traffic west of
mile marker 8.16 Despite an absence of “developed roadways upon which
to turn,” NMDOT constructed a center turn lane between mile markers 8
and 10.17 As a result of NMDOT’s decision to provide access to undeveloped roads, no jersey barriers were installed along this two-mile stretch
of road.18
Personal representatives of decedents (“Plaintiffs”) brought a
wrongful death suit against NMDOT under the Tort Claims Act, alleging
that NMDOT negligently maintained NM 502 at the location of the accident by failing to install traffic control devices (concrete jersey barriers)
to prevent crossover collisions, despite having notice of a dangerous condition.19 In order to demonstrate NMDOT’s notice that a dangerous condition existed on the road, Plaintiffs offered evidence of other accidents
on NM 502.20
The district court considered this evidence,21 but found “Plaintiffs
could not show that [NMDOT] had notice of an ongoing defect of design
in that part of the road, so as to give rise to a duty . . . to correct it.”22 The
district court granted partial summary judgment to NMDOT, holding that
“the erection of barriers . . . was a matter of road design and within the

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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13. Id. ¶ 1.
14. Id. ¶ 5.
15. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., Concrete Barriers, http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/roadway_dept/policy_guide/road_hardware/ctrmeas
ures/concrete_barriers/concrt_barriers.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2014) (stating that
Jersey barriers are modular concrete or plastic traffic control devices “designed to
redirect, slow, or stop an errant vehicle from causing a more severe crash”).
16. Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 5.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Martinez v. New Mexico Dept. of Transp., 2011-NMCA-082, ¶ 4, 150 N.M.
204, 258 P.3d 483.
20. Id. (“Plaintiffs contended DOT had notice of (1) previous fatal accidents occurring on NM 502, (2) newspaper articles discussing the dangerousness of the road,
and (3) two citizens’ complaints made to DOT regarding the dangers of NM 502.”).
21. Id. ¶ 19 (“Their exhibits mentioned accidents over an eleven-and-a-half-mile
stretch of road. Yet, their motion for summary judgment asserted fault within a barrier-free, two-mile-long stretch of road.”).
22. Id. ¶ 5 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶ 25 (“[T]he district court determined
that the previous accidents occurred too far from the location of decedents’ accident
to prove that the same defect or dangerous condition was present.”).
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scope of preserved state immunity under the [Tort Claims Act].”23 The
remaining issue of negligent maintenance of a roadway (for the buildup
of red crushed cinder in the center-turn lane) went to trial where the jury
returned a verdict for NMDOT.24
Plaintiffs appealed, claiming the district court both “improperly
granted partial summary judgment on the issue of [NMDOT’s] duty to
erect concrete barriers”25 and “abused its discretion in excluding . . . [relevant] evidence.”26 The court of appeals reviewed de novo Plaintiffs’ claim
that NMDOT breached its duty to maintain NM 50227 and focused its
analysis on whether the installation of permanent concrete barriers constitutes roadway design or maintenance.28 Central to the court’s analysis
was (1) its definition of maintenance,29 (2) the physical attributes of
“jersey barriers,”30 and (3) the potential for permanent alteration to the
roadway.31 The court created a bright-line rule that permanent concrete
barriers are structural elements that change the design of a road, and
their placement is therefore subject to design immunity.32 The court distinguished the installation of concrete barriers from the installation of
other traffic control devices which earlier decisions recognized “under the
rubric of maintenance[,]” including temporary barricades placed to halt
traffic from entering a flooded arroyo, traffic control signals, “Wrong
Way” and “Do Not Enter” signs at highway exit ramps, and animal cross-

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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23. Id. ¶ 5.
24. Id. ¶ 6.
25. Id. ¶ 5.
26. Id. ¶ 6; see also id. ¶ 4.
27. Id. ¶ 10.
28. Id. ¶ 11 (“[O]ur view [is] that installations of structural elements are matters
for which design immunity is conferred. In carrying out the legislative objective of the
Act, it has been well established that installing and maintaining traffic controls constitute maintenance under the Act.” (internal citations omitted)).
29. Id. (“In Villanueva, we reaffirmed that ‘maintenance’ of a road involves ‘upkeep and repair[.]’ ” (quoting Villanueva v. City of Tucumcari, 1998-NMCA-138, ¶ 7,
125 N.M. 762, 962 P.2d 346)).
30. Id. ¶ 18 (“Erected Jersey barriers are concrete, dense structures, the placement of which is not simple[.]”).
31. Id. ¶ 17 (“Our ruling in Villanueva and comment in Bierner both hinged on
the difference between guiding traffic and designing permanent attributes of a road
itself. Though our comment in Bierner might have been dicta for that case, we now
conclude that erection of permanent barriers as part of a road constitutes a matter of
road design.”).
32. Id. ¶ 18 (“The addition of permanent concrete barriers, as Plaintiffs demand
in this particular case, is not a method of traffic control within the meaning of maintenance under the [Tort Claims] Act.”).
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ing signs.33 After holding that placement of permanent concrete barriers
is outside the scope of road maintenance under the Tort Claims Act, the
court declined to evaluate the evidentiary issue raised by Plaintiffs as to
NMDOT’s notice of a dangerous condition on NM 502.34
Plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the New Mexico
Supreme Court, which the court granted. On certiorari, the court heard
both issues that had been raised at the court of appeals: whether the installation of permanent concrete barriers constitutes maintenance under
the Tort Claims Act35 and whether the court should have submitted Plaintiff’s evidence of prior accidents to the jury.36 The supreme court reversed
on both issues and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial.
II. MAINTENANCE LIABILITY UNDER THE NEW MEXICO
TORT CLAIMS ACT
The Tort Claims Act grants immunity to “governmental entities and
any public employee acting within the scope of duty” from liability for
torts except as waived within the Act.37 As a matter of public policy, governmental entities may not be held liable for defects in the planning or
design of highways and streets.38 However, the Tort Claims Act waives
the state’s immunity for failure to properly maintain roadways. At the
time of enactment, design immunity under the Tort Claims Act was justified by state budgetary considerations.39 Although the economic justifica-

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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33. Id. ¶ 17 (citing cases).
34. Id. ¶ 21 (“[A]ny indication that a notice-based obligation to redesign or reconstruct a road might fall outside the state’s immunity from suit is not supported by New
Mexico law. . . . We affirm because the lack of permanent barriers in the center turn
lane was an attribute of the design of NM 502 and, as a result—and the summary
judgment reflects—DOT is immune from suit.”).
35. Martinez v. New Mexico Dept. of Transp., 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 1, 296 P.3d 468.
36. Id.
37. NMSA 1978, § 41-4-4(A) (1976).
38. NMSA 1978, § 41-4-2(A) (1976) (“The area within which the government has
the power to act for the public good is almost without limit, and therefore government
should not have the duty to do everything that might be done.”).
39. See Ruth L. Kovnat, Torts: Sovereign and Governmental Immunity in New
Mexico, 6 N.M. L. REV. 249, 249–50 (1975) (“Whatever the historical basis for the
protection of the sovereign from suit, it seems clear that the ready judicial acceptance
of the immunity in the United States and its preservation into the twentieth century is
substantially based on reluctance to permit invasion of the public coffers from the
satisfaction of liability judgments instead of for the public purposes for which they
were appropriated.”).
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tion has less relevance today, New Mexico courts have adopted new
rationales for the rule based on evolving public policy considerations.40
A. Traffic Control Device Placement as Maintenance Under the Tort
Claims Act
Prior to 1991, the Tort Claims Act did not contain any language defining “maintenance,”41 requiring courts to interpret the term.42 Courts
have interpreted “maintenance” in Section 41-4-11 to “effectuate its remedial purpose of ensuring that highways are made safe and kept safe for
the traveling public.”43 In 1987, the supreme court in Miller v. New Mexico Department of Transportation,44 held that the “issuance of oversize
vehicle permits [has] a bearing on the proper ‘maintenance’ of a highway.”45 In 1991, the legislature amended the Tort Claims Act to abrogate
Miller46 and limited the definition of “maintenance” under the Tort
Claims Act to exclude “conduct involved in the issuance of a permit,
driver’s license or other official authorization to use the roads or highways of the state in a particular manner.”47 Post-amendment analysis of
“maintenance” narrowly construed the amendment, finding that it only
“addressed the particular legal conclusion in Miller.”48
In Rutherford v. Chaves County, the supreme court emphasized the
legislature’s decision not to otherwise define or limit maintenance activities in the 1991 amendment49 and established the post-Miller definition of

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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40. See Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 36 (“The rationale for design immunity is to
prevent a jury from second-guessing the decision of a public entity regarding a particular plan or design of a public construction or improvement.” (internal quotation
omitted)).
41. Id. ¶ 13 (citing 1976 N.M. Laws, ch. 58, § 3.).
42. Rutherford v. Chaves Cnty., 2003-NMSC-010, ¶ 11, 133 N.M. 756, 69 P.3d
1199 (“In interpreting the meaning of a statute, our primary purpose is to give effect
to the Legislature’s intent.”).
43. Id. See also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 1980-NMCA-082, ¶ 10, 95
N.M. 56, 618 P.2d 894 (“[T]he New Mexico Legislature intended to protect the general public from injury by imposing liability upon governmental agencies when they
fail to maintain safe public highways.”).
44. Miller v. New Mexico Dep’t of Transp., 1987-NMSC-081, 106 N.M. 253, 741
P.2d 1374.
45. Id. ¶ 9.
46. See Rutherford, 2003-NMSC-010, ¶ 21 (“[T]he 1991 legislative amendment
specifically repudiated our decision in Miller[.]”).
47. NMSA 1978, § 41-4-3(E)(1) (1991).
48. Rutherford, 2003-NMSC-010, ¶ 21.
49. Id. (“[W]hen considering the definition of ‘maintenance,’ the Legislature
chose not to limit the meaning of the term ‘maintenance’ to ‘upkeep and repair.’ Notably, the Legislature also did not define maintenance to exclude traffic control.”).
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Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 25.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 1.
Rutherford v. Chaves Cnty., 2002-NMCA-059, ¶ 19, 132 N.M. 289, 47 P.3d
Rutherford, 2003-NMSC-010, ¶ 9.

06/25/2014 11:26:56

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
448.
59.
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maintenance under the Tort Claims Act. The Rutherford court held “procedures for identifying hazards on roadways and the timeliness of minimizing or eliminating the risk of injury to the motoring public from those
hazards constitute maintenance activities for which immunity is
waived.”50 The court further clarified this definition by concluding, “the
identification and remediation of roadway hazards constitutes highway
maintenance under Section 41-4-11 of the [Tort Claims Act].”51
In Rutherford, plaintiff’s vehicle was swept away by floodwaters
while he attempted to maneuver through a flooded intersection in Chaves
County.52 While the location was a normally dry arroyo, drainage from
mountain rains periodically caused high water flow through the arroyo at
the intersection.53 Customarily, the Chaves County Road Department
used portable barricades to close the intersection during periods when
runoff water was flowing through the arroyo.54 Thirty minutes before the
plaintiff’s accident, the Chaves County Sheriff’s Department was notified
of dangerous flood conditions at the intersection but failed to erect the
portable barricades prior to the plaintiff’s arrival.55
Following the accident, plaintiff filed personal injury and wrongful
death claims against the county, alleging a failure to implement a reasonable system for closing the intersection during periods of heavy rain and
flooding.56 The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants
based on immunity from suit under the Tort Claims Act.57 The court of
appeals reversed, holding “the County failed to achieve one objective-the
timely controlling of traffic [at the intersection] when the water was high.
This objective is entirely consistent with the notion of highway maintenance as developed by our appellate courts.”58
The supreme court affirmed Rutherford. The court noted “[t]he
placement of portable barricades is a method of traffic control under the
Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices which must be followed by
local authorities. We have repeatedly held and reiterate . . . that traffic
controls constitute maintenance activities under the [Tort Claims Act].”59
Additionally, the Rutherford court established the post-amendment defi-
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nition of maintenance under the Tort Claims Act,60 and specified that
highway maintenance should not be solely equated with upkeep and
repair.61
Martinez is the most recent in a line of cases (subject to exceptions
discussed below) where either the supreme court or the court of appeals
have defined “maintenance” to include placement of traffic control
devices.62
The supreme court has not reviewed the few exceptions where the
court of appeals excluded a traffic control device from the definition of
maintenance. In Villanueva v. City of Tucumcari, the court of appeals
upheld a grant of summary judgment based in part on a finding that structural changes to the sidewalk would constitute installation rather than
maintenance under the Tort Claims Act.63 The plaintiffs did not ask the
supreme court to review the court of appeals’ holding.64 In Bernier v. City
of Truth or Consequences, the court of appeals addressed plaintiffs’ allegation that the city had a duty to “erect barriers or curbs on either side of
the street to prevent vehicles from leaving the parking lot and entering
the propane business,”65 by stating in dicta that the erection of barriers or
curbs “appear[s] to involve design.”66 As in Villanueva, plaintiffs did not
file a petition for certiorari, leaving open the question as to whether the

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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60. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
61. Rutherford, 2003-NMSC-010, ¶ 22 (“Chaves County argues that since 1991 the
Court of Appeals has limited the definition of ‘maintenance’ to ‘upkeep and repair[.]’. . . The Court of Appeals holding should not be construed as limiting the definition of maintenance to upkeep and repair.”).
62. See, e.g., Rickerson v. State, 1980-NMCA-050, ¶ 10, 94 N.M. 473, 612 P.2d 703
(design immunity waived when City had knowledge of a dangerous condition and
failed to replace stop signs with traffic signal); Rutherford, 2003-NMSC-010, ¶ 9
(placement of portable barricades is road maintenance within the scope of the Tort
Claims Act); Pollock v. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 1999-NMCA-083, ¶ 11, 127
N.M. 521, 984 P.2d 768 (placement of “Wrong Way” and “Do Not Enter” warning
signs is road maintenance within the scope of the Tort Claims Act); Ryan v. New
Mexico State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 1998-NMCA-116, ¶ 8, 125 N.M. 588, 964 P.2d
149 (placement of signage warning of wild animals crossing the road is road maintenance within the scope of the Tort Claims Act); Lerma v. State Highway Dep’t, 1994NMSC-069, ¶ 8, 117 N.M. 782, 877 P.2d 1085 (failure to erect or repair fences along
highway is maintenance within the scope of the Tort Claims Act).
63. Villanueva v. City of Tucumcari, 1998-NMCA-138, ¶ 8, 125 N.M. 762, 965 P.2d
346 (“The addition of ramps is a structural change in the sidewalk,” and “such installation would not constitute ‘maintenance’ under Section 41-4-11(A) [but] would be a
‘reconstruct[ion]’ under Section 41-4-11(B)(2).”).
64. Id.
65. Bierner, 2004-NMCA-093, ¶ 21.
66. Id.
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supreme court would have affirmed the interpretation of this activity as
design.67
B. The Martinez Definition of Maintenance Includes Traffic Control
Device Placement
In Martinez, the supreme court held that the court of appeals had
deviated from Rutherford, reaffirming its interpretation of the word
“maintenance” in the Tort Claims Act.68 In doing so, the supreme court
provided guidance to trial courts and practitioners with respect to governmental entities’ maintenance responsibilities in the placement of traffic
control devices to remedy known dangerous conditions on roadways.
Martinez held the placement of traffic control devices constitutes maintenance, regardless of the physical or temporal characteristics of the devices,69 and repudiated the court of appeal’s bright-line rule that excluded
permanent concrete barriers from a maintenance duty analysis under the
Tort Claims Act.70
1. Rationale
The New Mexico Supreme Court began its analysis by identifying a
divergence in the definition of maintenance between the court of appeals’
holding in Martinez and the previously articulated rule of Rutherford.71 In
Martinez, the court of appeals followed Villanueva, defining maintenance
as “upkeep and repair” and holding that “installation[ ] of structural elements are matters for which design immunity is conferred.”72 The supreme court disagreed, stating that the court of appeals had misapplied

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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67. Id. (no denial of certiorari by the New Mexico Supreme Court noted).
68. Martinez v. New Mexico Dept. of Transp., 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 26, 296 P.3d 468
(“The duty to maintain a roadway subsumes within it a duty to remediate a known
dangerous condition, regardless of whether the source of danger can be traced back to
a design feature. If not our specific holding in Rutherford, it is at the very least a
strong inference from what we said in that opinion.”).
69. Id. ¶ 21 (“[T]he term maintenance requires a reasonable response to a known
dangerous condition on a roadway. When the reasonableness of that response pertains to traffic controls, it is not measured just by size or weight, permanence or mobility, whether the defect is a structural element or more transitory in nature.”).
70. Martinez v. New Mexico Dept. of Transp., 2011-NMCA-082, ¶ 21, 150 N.M.
204, 258 P.3d 483 (“The addition of permanent concrete barriers, as Plaintiffs demand
in this particular case, is not a method of traffic control within the meaning of maintenance under the Act.”).
71. Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 20 (“Despite what we said in Rutherford, the
Court of Appeals’ opinion in the present case closely aligned the meaning of maintenance with upkeep and repair.”).
72. Martinez, 2011-NMCA-082, ¶ 11 (quoting Villanueva v. City of Tucumcari,
1998-NMCA-138, ¶ 8, 125 N.M. 762, 965 P.2d 346).

35097-nmx_44-2 Sheet No. 123 Side B

06/25/2014 11:26:56

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-2\NMX206.txt

538

unknown

Seq: 10

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

25-JUN-14

11:06

[Vol. 44

the holding from Rutherford.73 Instead, the supreme court characterized
Rutherford as holding that “[t]he duty to maintain a roadway subsumes
within it a duty to remediate a known dangerous condition, regardless of
whether the source of danger can be traced back to a design feature.”74
The court then turned its analysis to a discussion of traffic control
devices. With respect to the size and weight of concrete barriers, the court
dismissed the idea that physical characteristics of traffic control devices
play any role in a maintenance analysis.75 Regarding the permanence of
the installed devices and the potential alteration to the original design of
the roadway, the court analogized to stop lights—which the court of appeals previously classified as maintenance features under the Tort Claims
Act.76
In rejecting the physical characteristics and permanence of traffic
control devices as part of a maintenance analysis,77 the court clarified the
analytic framework for determining maintenance responsibilities:
Notice of a dangerous condition—whether based on the original
design or some other intervening characteristic—triggers a maintenance obligation for which DOT can be held legally responsible
under the Act. Whether this obligation requires a permanent solution, such as a traffic control signal or a center barrier, or a temporary one, such as the moveable barriers in Rutherford, the
maintenance obligation of reasonable care remains the same. And
the reasonableness of that response to a known danger—whether

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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73. Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 20 (“The proper scope of the term maintenance
in a case such as this was previously articulated by the Court of Appeals in Jacobo v.
City of Albuquerque, . . . where the Court accurately quoted our specific holding from
Rutherford––New Mexico cases have held that the term maintenance is not limited to
upkeep and repair but that the identification and remediation of roadway hazards
constitutes highway maintenance under Section 41-4-11 of the [Act].” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
74. Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 26.
75. Id. ¶ 25 (“Rather than focusing on what DOT was being asked to do—remedy
a dangerous condition—the Court of Appeals was distracted by the sheer size or
weight of the proposed remedy, a distinction absent from the text of the Act.”).
76. Id. ¶ 23 (“A traffic signal is also a permanent and substantial feature of a
roadway. Once placed, a traffic signal is generally not removed and becomes a permanent fixture of the intersection. . . . Yet the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
installing a traffic signal constitutes maintenance under the Act.” (citations omitted)).
77. Id. ¶ 21 (“[M]aintenance requires a reasonable response to a known dangerous condition on a roadway. When the reasonableness of that response pertains to
traffic controls, it is not measured just by size or weight, permanence or mobility,
whether the defect is a structural element or more transitory in nature.”).

35097-nmx_44-2 Sheet No. 124 Side A

06/25/2014 11:26:56

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-2\NMX206.txt

Summer 2014]

unknown

Seq: 11

25-JUN-14

THE DECLINE OF DESIGN IMMUNITY

11:06

539

with a temporary barrier or a permanent one—remains in the
good hands of the jury to resolve.78

In sum, the Martinez holding rejects a bright-line standard related to
physical or temporal characteristics of traffic control devices under the
Tort Claims Act. However, questions remain as to exactly why district
courts and the court of appeals deviated from the Rutherford standard in
Villanueva, Bernier, and Martinez, and what impact the supreme court’s
holding in Martinez will have on New Mexico jurisprudence.
2. Analysis
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78. Id. ¶ 34.
79. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
81. See Martinez v. New Mexico Dept. of Transp., 2011-NMCA-082, ¶ 17, 150
N.M. 204, 258 P.3d 483 (citing Bierner v. City of Truth or Consequences, 2004NMCA-093, ¶ 21).
82. Id. ¶ 17.
83. Rutherford v. Chaves Cnty., 2003-NMSC-010, ¶ 9, 133 N.M. 756, 69 P.3d 1199.
84. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., MANUAL ON
UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES FOR STREETS AND HIGHWAYS 628 (2009)
(“When two-lane, two-way traffic must be maintained on one roadway of a normally
divided highway, opposing vehicular traffic shall be separated with . . . temporary
traffic barriers (concrete safety-shape or approved alternate).”).
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Despite the holding in Rutherford, the court of appeals held that
concrete barriers were outside the scope of traffic control in Martinez.79
The supreme court highlighted in Martinez the court of appeals’ correct
application of the Rutherford analysis in Jacobo v. City of Albuquerque
among other cases.80 Underlying the court of appeals’ ruling in Martinez
was the holding of Villanueva and dicta from Bernier. In Martinez, the
court of appeals followed the reasoning of these cases,81 distinguished the
temporary barricades erected in Rutherford, and created a bright-line
rule that excluded concrete barricades because they were more akin to
“permanent attributes of the road itself[,]” and not temporary measures
designed to guide traffic.82
Analysis of the cases above offers one possible explanation for this
deviation. In Rutherford, the supreme court specifically noted that the
“placement of portable barricades is a method of traffic control under the
Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices which must be followed by
local authorities.”83 The Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices
(“Manual”) does not refer to concrete barriers as a method of permanent
traffic control.84 The Manual makes only a single reference to “jersey bar-
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riers” in a separate context.85 Additionally, a distinction between the temporary barriers in Rutherford and permanent barriers requested by
appellants in Martinez is supported by numerous references to temporary
barriers in the Manual.86 Given factual distinctions in cases decided by the
court of appeals post-Rutherford, it is possible those courts believed that
the Manual determined whether traffic control devices were maintenance
or design features.
Notably, the supreme court makes no reference to the Manual in
the Martinez opinion. Instead, it focused on the shortcomings of the court
of appeals’ bright-line rule:
The Court [of Appeals] focused more on the distinguishing characteristics of a center barrier versus a stoplight versus a sign warning of animals crossing, rather than the overarching principle
enunciated in both the [Tort Claims] Act and in our case law—the
need for action to remedy a dangerous condition on a roadway.87
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85. Id. at 563 (“[J]ersey barriers . . . can satisfactorily delineate a pedestrian
path.”).
86. The phrase “temporary traffic barrier” appears in the Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control sixty-five different times whereas the phrase “permanent traffic barrier” does not appear.
87. Martinez v. New Mexico Dept. of Transp., 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 25, 296 P.3d
468.
88. See NMSA 1978, § 41-4-11.
89. NMSA 1978, § 41-4-3(E)(1).
90. E.g., NMSA 1978, § 41-4-3(E) (§ 41-4-3(E) was adopted by the legislature in
1991 following the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller v. New Mexico Department of
Transportation.); see also Rio Grande Chapter of Sierra Club v. New Mexico Mining
Commn., 2003-NMSC-005, ¶ 27, 133 N.M. 97, 61 P.3d 806 (“If the legislature intended
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The supreme court’s language clearly indicates that whether a roadway
feature is part of the maintenance or design of the road turns on whether
the feature was installed to remedy a dangerous condition, not whether
the feature is part of maintenance or design by definition.
Section 41-4-11 does not distinguish between temporary and permanent traffic control devices in the context of design, construction, or reconstruction and provides no language limiting the size or other physical
characteristics of traffic control devices in the context of road maintenance.88 The only statutory limitation on roadway maintenance activity in
the Tort Claims Act is “conduct involved with the issuance of a permit,
driver’s license or other official authorization to use the roads or highways of the State in a particular manner.”89 Given the vested power of the
legislature to limit the definition of maintenance in response to shifts in
public opinion or judicial action,90 its decision not to do so indicates a
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tacit acceptance of the Rutherford standard. In other words, accepted
principles of statutory construction support Martinez’s holding, as the
plain language of the statute fails to provide a clear standard for determining what a traffic control device is under the Tort Claims Act.91
C. Impacts of the Martinez Holding on a Governmental Entity’s
Maintenance Responsibility as Related to Traffic Control Device
Placement
Martinez clarifies New Mexico jurisprudence on the duty of governmental entities to remediate dangerous conditions on public roadways.92
In essence, the supreme court rejected an attempt by the court of appeals
to essentially equate what is or is not a traffic control device under the
Tort Claims Act in New Mexico to Justice Stewart’s oft quoted “I know it
when I see it” standard regarding obscenity.93 Novel issues could, of
course, arise in New Mexico.94 However, by providing guidance with respect to the definition of a traffic control device, the Martinez court has
articulated the appropriate analytical process for trial courts deciding
similar cases.
Common law jurisprudence is replete with examples of appellate
courts providing guidance to trial courts in similar situations.95 While
other contexts may also lead a court to provide guidance in an opinion,
these roadmaps are periodically necessitated by trial courts distinguishing

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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to prohibit the expansion of a permit area, it certainly could have expressly stated
so.”).
91. See State v. Willie, 2009-NMSC-037, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 481, 212 P.3d 369 (“The
principal command of statutory construction is that the court should determine and
effectuate the intent of the legislature, using the plain language of the statute as the
primary indicator of legislative intent[.]”).
92. Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 26 (reaffirming holding from Rutherford) (“If
not our specific holding in Rutherford, it is at least the very strong inference from
what we said in that opinion.”).
93. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
94. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Chester, 842 F.Supp. 147, 149 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (plaintiffs alleged that a school crossing guard constituted a traffic control device for the
purposes of the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act).
95. E.g., State v. Juan, 2010-NMSC-041, ¶ 20, 148 N.M. 747, 242 P.3d 314 (“[T]o
provide guidance to the trial court, we reach the merits of Defendant’s remaining
three claims, which may arise on remand.”); Pincheira v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2008NMSC-049, ¶ 65, 144 N.M. 601, 190 P.3d 322 (“We therefore provide guidance for
future protective orders.”); In re Convisser, 2010-NMSC-037, ¶ 1, 148 N.M. 732, 242
P.3d 299 (“We now issue this Opinion to further explain our decision and provide
guidance for future cases.”); State v. Leslie, 2004-NMCA-106, ¶ 4, 136 N.M. 244, 96
P.3d 805 (“[R]ather than enter a simple order reversing with no discussion of the
merits, we issue this opinion in order to provide guidance in future cases.”).
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the facts of one case from those of another leading to a misapplication of
controlling precedent. For example, in State v. Silago, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals faced a similar issue.96 The defendant faced trial on
charges of vehicular homicide, great bodily harm by motor vehicle, and
aggravated DWI.97 During the course of the investigation, a six hour and
twenty minute delay occurred between the time of the accident and the
blood test to determine the level of intoxication.98 Defendant’s blood alcohol content at the time of the test was 0.02.99 The State moved for admission of expert testimony on retrograde extrapolation.100
New Mexico courts accept retrograde extrapolation as an evidentiary practice as interpreted in the BAC nexus cases.101 In Silago, the trial
court excluded the State’s proffered expert testimony after distinguishing
the facts of the case at bar.102 Because in State v. Baldwin, a defendant’s
DWI conviction was overturned “when the delay was two hours and fifteen minutes,”103 the trial court in Silago used the two hours and fifteen
minute delay between arrest and blood alcohol content testing as a
threshold inquiry beyond which “retrograde extrapolation evidence
would be inadmissible[.]”104
By imposing a two hour and fifteen minute bright-line standard for
admissibility of retrograde analysis, the trial court departed from the balancing test articulated by the BAC nexus cases.105 In reversing the trial
court’s holding, the court of appeals noted, “the BAC nexus cases do not
establish a bright-line rule circumscribing a trial court’s decision to admit
or exclude relation-back evidence. Instead, they provide guidance to a
trial court in determining when relation-back evidence is necessary.”106
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96. State v. Silago, 2005-NMCA-100, ¶ 20, 138 N.M. 301, 119 P.3d 181 (“The trial
court’s analysis of the BAC nexus cases was flawed.”).
97. Id. ¶ 2.
98. Id.
99. Id. ¶ 4.
100. Id. (“[R]etrograde extrapolation is used to calculate a given BAC back to a
prior time using generally accepted rates of alcohol burn-off.”).
101. See State v. Christmas, 2002-NMCA-020, ¶¶ 24, 28, 131 N.M. 591, 40 P.3d
1035; State v. Martinez, 2002-NMCA-043, ¶ 11, 132 N.M. 101, 45 P.3d 41; State v.
Baldwin, 2001-NMCA-063, ¶ 13, 130 N.M. 705, 30 P.3d 394.
102. Silago, 2005-NMCA-100, ¶ 10.
103. Id. ¶ 18 (citing Baldwin, 2001-NMCA-063, ¶ 4).
104. Id. ¶ 19.
105. Id. ¶ 20 (“The trial court’s analysis of the BAC nexus cases was flawed. The
cases do not place an outer limit on the delay between the time of driving and testing.
At most, they explain that a delay of any significance necessitates the introduction of
some evidence providing a nexus between BAC and the time of driving. This is true
whether the delay is two hours or six hours.”).
106. Id. ¶ 23 (emphasis added).
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In Martinez, the supreme court’s holding advances the same proposition—that distinguishable facts should not subsume general legal
rules. To emphasize this point, the court stated that “the term maintenance requires a reasonable response to a known dangerous condition.
When the reasonableness of that response pertains to traffic controls, it is
not measured just by size or weight, permanence or mobility, whether the
defect is a structural element or is more transitory in nature.”107 This guidance should prevent future deviation or the application of a bright-line
standard with respect to traffic control device analysis by lower courts.
The supreme court in Martinez reminds trial courts and practitioners
that no bright-line rule is utilized to limit claims of negligent maintenance
under the Tort Claims Act. This guidance may prove beneficial to parties
injured on New Mexico roadways in the future. This author can imagine
scenarios where potential plaintiffs are turned away by litigators, or are
subjected to summary judgment by trial courts, given uncertainty as to
the relationship between traffic control devices and “maintenance.” PostMartinez, two things are clear: (1) plaintiffs have an ongoing burden to
provide evidence that requested traffic control devices would remedy a
known dangerous condition that exists on a roadway in order to avoid
summary judgment, and (2) the debate over the physical or temporal
characteristics of those devices appears settled by the supreme court’s
holding in Martinez.
III. ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF A DANGEROUS
CONDITION ON A ROADWAY

C M
Y K
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107. Martinez v. New Mexico Dept. of Transp., 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 21, 296 P.3d
468.
108. Martinez v. New Mexico Dept. of Transp., 2011-NMCA-082, ¶ 25, 150 N.M.
204, 258 P.3d 483.
109. State v. Lujan, 1980-NMSC-036, ¶ 13, 94 N.M. 232, 608 P.2d 1114.
110. Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 41.
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In Martinez, the district court “determined that the previous accidents occurred too far from the location of decedents’ accident to prove
that the same defect or dangerous condition was present.”108 While determinations as to the relevance, and therefore admissibility, of evidence are
generally a discretionary function of the presiding court,109 the supreme
court held “the district court took an unnecessarily narrow view of what
might reasonably persuade a jury on the question of notice.”110 The Martinez court reversed because “[t]aking a static, rigid view of the ‘location’
of the accident takes from the jury the opportunity to decide whether
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[NM]DOT acted reasonably under the circumstances.”111 But what information is sufficient to put a governmental entity on notice of a dangerous
condition? Martinez suggests that a governmental entity need not actually
be aware of a dangerous condition in order to have a maintenance responsibility; instead, the state may have a duty to maintain if it has addressed similar dangerous conditions elsewhere in its jurisdiction (i.e.,
constructive notice).112
A. Evidence of Actual or Constructive Notice
In addition to defining highway maintenance responsibilities related
to placement of traffic control devices, New Mexico appellate courts have
also defined when a governmental entity has sufficient notice of a dangerous condition under the Tort Claims Act.113 Precedent has made clear that
notice is a question of fact to be determined by the jury114 and is inextricably intertwined with the admissibility of probative evidence.115
Under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, a governmental entity’s
duty to maintain a roadway is triggered by actual or constructive notice of
a dangerous condition.116 Express government recognition of a dangerous
condition at a specific location constitutes actual notice.117 Actual notice
is also demonstrated by government acknowledgement of a dangerous

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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111. Id. ¶ 43.
112. Id. (emphasis added) (“Depending on the particular characteristics of the
road, evidence of other collisions occurring in the general area of the particular collision or in other areas with similar characteristics, may be relevant to notice.”).
113. Ryan v. New Mexico State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 1998-NMCA-116, ¶ 10,
125 N.M. 588, 964 P.2d 149 (“Whether Defendant had notice of the dangerous condition created by wild animals on the road is disputed by the parties. Plaintiffs
presented affidavit evidence that a series of accidents occurred on that particular
stretch of highway as a result of animal crossings. . . . When evidence as to an issue of
material fact is disputed, summary judgment is improper.”).
114. Id. ¶ 8.
115. Ambassador E. Apts. Investors v. Ambassador E. Invs., 1987-NMCA-135, ¶
18, 106 N.M. 534, 746 P.2d 163 (“Whether or not there remains a ‘viable issue of fact,’
however, depends on the material presented to the trial courts by the parties.”).
116. Blackburn v. State, 1982-NMCA-073, ¶¶ 30, 32, 98 N.M. 34, 644 P.2d 548, 553
(“Plaintiff was required . . . to prove either that the State created the dangerous condition or if they didn’t create it, then they had actual or constructive knowledge. . . . The
converse . . . is that where the State has not created the dangerous condition, no duty
to remedy the dangerous condition arises until actual or constructive notice is
present.”).
117. See Rutherford v. Chaves Cnty., 2003-NMSC-010, ¶ 15, 133 N.M. 756, 69 P.3d
1199 (“Chaves County does not dispute that it was aware that floodwaters at the
Spence Road Crossing would occasionally run at dangerously high levels.”).
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condition through its internal planning process.118 Constructive notice, by
contrast, is “notice arising by presumption of law from the existence of
facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of,”119 or
“notice presumed by law to have been acquired by a person and thus
imputed to that person.”120 New Mexico jurisprudence applies constructive notice to duty analysis in the context of maintenance responsibilities
under the Tort Claims Act.121
In Romero v. State, the plaintiff alleged the state negligently maintained Rio Arriba County Road 41, causing a single vehicle accident.122
Plaintiff offered expert testimony “that the accident site was dangerous
because there was insufficient banking or superelevation on the curve,
the curve was sharp, the curve was compound, and the roadway had an
insufficient shoulder.”123 In response, defendant claimed plaintiff’s evidence characterized elements of design for which immunity is not waived
under section 41-4-11(B) of the Act.124 The district court admitted plaintiff’s expert testimony and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.125
The court of appeals reversed the judgment, holding that the expert’s testimony should have been excluded because the state could not be held
liable for the defects the expert testified about.126 The supreme court reinstated the judgment127 and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony because “[the expert’s
testimony] tended to establish negligent maintenance, especially absent
any evidence of design[.]”128 Significantly, the supreme court rejected the
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118. See Rickerson v. State, 1980-NMCA-050, ¶ 5, 94 N.M. 473, 612 P.2d 703 (“[A]
need for installation of traffic signals at that intersection, ‘for the general safety of the
citizens of the City,’ was recognized by the City and that need conveyed to the State
Highway Department seven months before the fatal accident . . . occurred.”).
119. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1164 (9th ed. 2009).
120. Id.
121. E.g., Ryan v. New Mexico State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 1998-NMCA-116,
¶ 8, 125 N.M. 588, 964 P.2d 149 (“Defendant may still have had a duty to remedy the
dangerous condition by placing warning signs along the roadway if Defendant had
actual or constructive notice of wild animals crossing the road and causing driving
accidents.”); Rutherford, 2003-NMSC-010, ¶ 14 (“It is not enough for a plaintiff to
simply prove that the hazard exists; the plaintiff must prove that the governmental
entity had actual or constructive notice of the hazard.”).
122. Romero v. State, 1991-NMCA-042, ¶ 1, 112 N.M. 291, 814 P.2d 1019.
123. Id. ¶ 14.
124. Id.
125. Id. ¶ 1.
126. Id. ¶ 20.
127. Romero v. State, 1991-NMSC-071, ¶ 1, 112 N.M. 332, 815 P.2d 628.
128. Id. ¶ 5–6.
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court of appeals’ “unduly restrictive interpretation both on admissibility
of relevant evidence and . . . the term ‘maintenance.’”129
In Ryan v. New Mexico State Highway and Transportation Department, the court addressed whether the state had notice of a dangerous
condition sufficient to trigger a duty to install animal warning signs.130 In
Ryan, the plaintiff struck an elk while driving eastbound on New Mexico
State Road 12 (“NM 12”) three miles west of Reserve.131 No signs warning of animal activity were posted on NM 12 west of Reserve.132 The
plaintiffs alleged negligence on the part of the State Highway and Transportation Department, given the Department’s failure to post warning
signs.133 Supporting this claim, plaintiffs offered evidence of (1) a series of
accidents reported on this stretch of road;134 and (2) the installation of six
animal crossing signs over a forty-mile stretch east of Reserve, indicating
defendant’s belief that the signs could prevent accidents.135 The district
court found the State owed no duty to plaintiffs and granted summary
judgment.136 The court of appeals reversed, holding “[w]hether Defendant
had a duty to warn drivers of wild-animal crossings on the seven-mile
stretch of road west of Reserve where this accident occurred turns on
whether or not Defendant had actual or constructive notice that wildanimal crossings created a dangerous condition in that location.”137 This
holding implies that plaintiff’s evidence was admissible to prove the State
breached its duty to maintain the road.138 The supreme court approvingly
cited Ryan’s analysis of notice in its discussion of notice in Martinez.139
B. Notice and Evidence in Martinez
1. Rationale

C M
Y K
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129. Id. ¶ 6.
130. Ryan v. New Mexico State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 1998-NMCA-116, ¶ 6,
125 N.M. 588, 964 P.2d 149.
131. Id. ¶ 2.
132. Id. ¶ 3.
133. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4.
134. Id. ¶ 10.
135. Id. ¶ 15 (emphasis added).
136. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4.
137. Id. ¶ 7.
138. Id. ¶ 15 (“Because breach of duty is a factual question, and because there are
material facts at issue, we hold that summary judgment was improper.”).
139. Martinez v. New Mexico Dept. of Transp., 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 44, 296 P.3d 468
(citing Ryan, 1998-NMCA-116, ¶¶ 9–10).
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After articulating its traffic control device holding in Martinez, the
supreme court offered support for the proposition that a maintenance
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responsibility is triggered by “notice of a dangerous condition.”140 Referring to the legislative intent of the Tort Claims Act, the court noted a
logical disconnect between allowing perpetual design immunity and protecting drivers on New Mexico’s roadways.141 Drawing on out-of-state
opinions, the court recognized that “initial roadway design decisions may
be based on weighing potential risks . . . without the benefit of an accident
history or other empirical evidence demonstrating how the design works
in practice.”142 With this understanding in place, the court opined that
once the government has empirical data as to the functionality of a road
design, ongoing design immunity would frustrate the Tort Claims Act’s
purpose.143
The supreme court then shifted its attention to the issue of whether
NMDOT was on notice of a dangerous condition on NM 502. The district
court concluded that Plaintiffs’ evidence of accidents on NM 502 was not
relevant to whether NMDOT had notice of a dangerous condition at the
location of the accident.144 The court of appeals deferred to this ruling,
though its analysis only considered whether evidence of previous accidents was relevant to Plaintiff’s remaining claim of negligent maintenance
of a roadway as related to red crushed cinder present in the center turn
lane at the time of the accident.145
The supreme court, having determined that NMDOT had a duty to
maintain if it had notice of a dangerous condition, reevaluated Plaintiffs’
evidence in this context.146 Instead of focusing only on evidence pertain-
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140. Id. ¶ 34.
141. Id. ¶ 35 (“Allowing design immunity to continue into perpetuity would not
further the purpose of design immunity, while frustrating the overall purpose of encouraging safe highway maintenance.”).
142. Id. ¶ 37 (citing Baldwin v. State of California, 6 Cal.3d 424, 434, 491 P.2d 1121,
1128 (1972)).
143. Id. ¶ 39 (“The sole purpose of waiver in Section 41-4-11(A) is to ensure that
highways are made and kept safe for the traveling public. This ‘sole purpose’ would be
frustrated if DOT could simply throw its hands up and claim immunity based on design, despite knowing, based on empirical evidence, that what was designed in theory
proved fatal in fact.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
144. Id. ¶ 40 (quoting Martinez v. New Mexico Dept. of Transp., 2011-NMCA-082,
¶ 25, 150 N.M. 204, 258 P.3d 483) (“[T]he district court determined that the previous
accidents occurred too far from the location of decedents’ accident to prove that the
same defect or dangerous condition was present.”).
145. Martinez, 2011-NMCA-082, ¶ 27 (“In view of DOT’s immunity for the design
and construction of the center turn lane, and the absence of a direct connection between the evidence of previous complaints and accidents to DOT’s duty to sweep
gravel in the center turn lane, Plaintiffs’ evidence has little, if any, probative value.”).
146. Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 41 (“With this evidence, Plaintiffs intended to
show that DOT had notice—that it knew or should have known—of a dangerous
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ing to the exact location of the accident,147 the court cited Ryan, which
held that “evidence that a series of accidents occurred on that particular
stretch of highway as a result of wild-animal crossings,” was relevant to a
duty analysis.148
The court also cited Hull v. South Coast Catamarans, L.P., which
held that notice “becomes a question of law only if no room for ordinary
minds to differ exists.”149 Based both on the question as to whether “reasonable minds could differ on whether such facts were sufficient to provide [NMDOT] with adequate notice[,]”150 as well as conflicting expert
testimony related to operational characteristics along NM 502,151 the
court held “the district court took an unnecessarily narrow view of what
might reasonably persuade a jury on the question of notice.”152 Consequently, the court found reversible error in the exclusion of Plaintiffs’
offered evidence of previous accidents on NM 502.153
A careful reading of Ryan demonstrates one possible justification
for the district court’s decision to exclude the Plaintiffs’ evidence in Martinez. However, the supreme court’s opinion in Martinez indicates a
broad, and potentially expanding, scope of inquiry from which relevant
evidence may be drawn to demonstrate a governmental entity’s notice of
a dangerous condition on a roadway.
2. Analysis
In Martinez, the supreme court affirmed the Ryan methodology of
location analysis.154 In doing so, the court noted that “[t]aking a static,
rigid view of the ‘location’ of the accident takes from the jury the opportunity to decide whether DOT acted reasonably under the circumstances,”155 rejecting the trial court’s “unnecessarily narrow view of what
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condition along NM 502, including the collision site, sufficient to trigger a duty to take
remedial measures.”)
147. Id. ¶ 42.
148. Id. (quoting Ryan v. New Mexico State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 1998NMCA-116, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 588, 964 P.2d 149 (emphasis original)).
149. Hull v. S. Coast Catamarans, L.P., 365 S.W.3d 35, 44 (Tex. App. 2011).
150. Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 44.
151. Id. ¶ 45–46.
152. Id. ¶ 41.
153. Id. ¶ 50.
154. Id. ¶ 42 (“In Ryan, the Court of Appeals noted that the plaintiffs ‘presented
affidavit evidence that a series of accidents occurred on that particular stretch of highway as a result of wild-animal crossings.’ This is a more appropriate view of relevancy
when determining whether DOT had notice of a dangerous condition along a highway.” (internal citations omitted)).
155. Id. ¶ 43.
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156. Id. ¶ 41.
157. Martinez v. New Mexico Dept. of Transp., 2011-NMCA-082, ¶ 5, 150 N.M.
204, 258 P.3d 483.
158. Ryan v. New Mexico State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 1998-NMCA-116, ¶ 7,
125 N.M. 588, 964 P.2d 149 (emphasis added).
159. Id. ¶ 8 (emphasis added).
160. Id. ¶ 12 (emphasis added).
161. Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis added).
162. Martinez, 2011-NMCA-082, ¶ 5 (emphasis added).
163. Ryan, 1998-NMCA-116, ¶¶ 10, 15.
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might reasonably persuade a jury on the question of notice.”156 In Martinez, the district court chose one of three viable readings of Ryan to evaluate the admissibility of the plaintiff’s evidence of a dangerous condition.
The district court’s analysis was as follows: (1) acknowledge potential
duty on part of NMDOT to maintain; (2) evaluate evidence of previous
accidents on NM 502; (3) find the Martinez accident distinguishable from
previous accidents based on the accident’s location; (4) exclude evidence
of previous accidents; (5) determine NMDOT lacked actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition; and (6) find no duty to maintain
existed at the location of the accident.157
Why did the district court focus specifically on notice of a dangerous
condition at the location of the accident? In Ryan, the court of appeals
failed to clarify which of three distinct recitations of its holding must be
followed by trial courts. Paragraph seven states, “Whether Defendant
had a duty to warn . . . turns on whether Defendant had actual or constructive notice that wild-animal crossings created a dangerous condition
in that location.”158 Paragraph eight states, “Defendant may still have had
a duty to remedy the dangerous condition . . . if Defendant had actual or
constructive notice of wild animals crossing the road and causing driving
accidents.”159 Finally, paragraph twelve states, “Whether this duty required the posting of warning signs depends on whether Defendant had
actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition existing on this
road.”160
A literal reading of paragraph seven could lead to the conclusion
that under Ryan, actual or constructive notice must be applied to “a dangerous condition in that location.”161 This reading of Ryan would explain
the district court’s exclusion of evidence in Martinez after finding
“[p]laintiffs could not show that DOT had notice of an ongoing defect of
design in that part of the road.”162 However, location was not so narrowly
construed in Ryan. Instead, the court of appeals considered plaintiff’s evidence of previous accidents and state action to limit accidents not just at
the scene of this accident, but from the surrounding area.163
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a. Historical Context for a Broad Interpretation of
“Location of an Accident”
History and decisions from other state courts show that the more
expansive view of location is correct. For example, in Shaw v. President of
Sun Prairie, decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1889, the plaintiff was injured after falling through a rotten board of a raised wooden
sidewalk within the village.164 At trial, plaintiff introduced evidence showing the generally bad condition of the sidewalk both north and south of
the location of her accident.165 The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff.166
The village appealed, claiming that admitted testimony as to the condition of the sidewalk should have been limited to the precise location of
the accident.167 The court held the evidence admissible on the grounds
that it showed constructive notice of the defect at the precise location of
the accident.168 Shaw and its progeny demonstrate that courts have long
refused to limit evidence that establishes notice to the specific location of
a given accident. Population and infrastructure of the late 1800s necessarily limited the language used in denoting the scope of admissible evidence to municipalities. However, the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Martinez applies these same principles in holding Plaintiffs’ evidence “of
a history of cross-median collisions on NM 502” admissible as against
NMDOT; an entity with a considerably larger jurisdiction.169
b. Expansion of Admissible Evidence of Constructive Notice

C M
Y K

06/25/2014 11:26:56

164. Shaw v. Pres. of Village of Sun Prairie, 42 N.W. 271, 272 (Wis. 1889).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 271.
167. Id. at 272.
168. Id.
169. Martinez v. New Mexico Dept. of Transp., 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 40, 296 P.3d
468.
170. Id. ¶ 49.
171. New Mexico Department of Transportation District 1 maintains 5,322 lane
miles of roadway in Socorro, Catron, Grant, Hidalgo, Sierra, Dona Ana, and Luna
Counties. The New Mexico Department of Transportation is comprised of six districts.
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In Martinez, the supreme court held that “[t]he question of notice is
not a technical one. Simply put, it requires the fact-finder to decide
whether the evidence presented would alert a reasonable person of a particular fact.”170 Given this standard, a question arises as to the outer geographical limits of relevant evidence introduced for the purposes of
establishing constructive notice on the part of a governmental entity
when dealing with similar conditions: NMDOT has jurisdiction over
thousands of miles of roadways in New Mexico.171
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On this issue, the Martinez court held, “Depending on the particular
characteristics of the road, evidence of other collisions occurring in the
general area of the particular collision or in other areas with similar characteristics, may be relevant to [whether the state has] notice.”172 While
reasonable minds could differ as to whether this statement constitutes the
new standard for evidentiary analysis or dicta, the court undoubtedly expressed interest in expanding the scope of constructive notice by adopting
a “similar characteristics” analysis to determine the relevancy of
evidence.
The admission of evidence of similar characteristics has been implemented prior to Martinez. In New Mexico criminal cases, “[e]vidence of
other crimes has a strong probative value when there is sufficient evidence of similar characteristics of conduct in each crime to show the perpetrator of the other crime and the perpetrator of the crime for which
defendant has been charged is one and the same person.”173
Though rare, other jurisdictions have applied a “similar characteristics” analysis to the issue of constructive notice of a dangerous condition.
In Morrison v. Ted Wilkerson, Inc., the plaintiff suffered personal injuries
in Clay County, Missouri, after colliding with traffic control devices at a
construction site.174 The defendant moved to set aside the jury verdict,
asserting that the trial court erred in admitting plaintiff’s evidence that
demonstrated that the construction company had constructive notice of a
dangerous condition based on previous accidents under similar conditions
miles away at a construction site in Jackson County, Missouri.175 The
United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied
the motion:
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See NEW MEXICO DEPT. OF TRANSP., http://dot.state.nm.us/en/D1.html (last visited
Mar. 18, 2014).
172. Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 43 (emphasis added).
173. State v. Tafoya, 1986-NMCA-104, ¶ 30, 105 N.M. 117, 729 P.2d 1371 cert.
granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 487 U.S. 1229 (1998) (emphasis added).
174. Morrison v. Ted Wilkerson, Inc., 343 F.Supp. 1319, 1322 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
175. Id. at 1322, 1325.
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[a] reasonable construction of the evidence, however, shows that
the two locations were substantially similar in that both involved
the placing of lane barrels so that they might not be seen until it
was too late to avoid an unanticipated danger. The bridges constructed on both projects were similar. So were the methods of
construction. The width of the roadways were nearly the same.
The terrain and physical characteristics of the roadway and sur-
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roundings were similar. . . . The admission of this evidence was
within the discretion of the Court.176

The Martinez court’s introduction of a similar characteristics analysis into
questions of constructive notice is not creating a new evidentiary standard from whole cloth, but is instead applying an accepted standard to an
additional area of substantive law.
C. Potential Impacts of Allowing Evidence of Dangerous Condition
with Similar Characteristics for Constructive Notice
While the introduction of a similar characteristics analysis may only
be dicta for this case, the court’s choice of language indicates an interest
in expanding the doctrine of constructive notice to include not just a
“‘stretch’ of highway”177 in relative proximity to the site of an accident
where negligence is alleged, but to geographically distinct roadways
within a jurisdiction that possess similar characteristics to a roadway
where the government already has notice of a dangerous condition.
Dicta periodically evolve into law.178 The persuasive force of dicta
depends upon its nature as either obiter dicta179 or judicial dicta.180 In
Martinez, the court’s similar characteristics language is not so attenuated

06/25/2014 11:26:56
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176. Id. at 1326; see also State v. Willian, 423 N.E.2d 668, 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)
(“Generally, evidence of conditions at a place other than the one in question is not
admissible to establish that a condition at the place in question is dangerous, unless
there is a showing of some connection between the places. Evidence of the condition
of the highway and the existence of similar defects at other places has been held
competent where the places are so close and the conditions so similar they can be
considered as substantially the same. However, in order to permit evidence of condition at other places, a proper basis must be laid for admission of such proof.” (citations omitted)).
177. Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 44.
178. Michael Sean Quinn, Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and
Adjudication: An Irreducible Pluralism of Principles, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 655, 767
(1998) (“[C]ourts frequently lay down broader rules than they need to, and then subsequent courts interpret those rules as binding precedent. In this way, over time, dicta
can evolve into holdings. This means that what was obiter dicta in a first case might
become judicial dicta in a second case and holdings in yet a third case.”).
179. Id. at 713 (“Obiter dicta are sometimes called mere dicta or pure dicta, and
they include ‘a mere remark made in passing, [which is] quite unnecessary to the issue
upon which the [court]’ is writing.” (quoting Ex parte Harrision, 741 S.W.2d 607, 609
(Tex. App. 1987)) (alteration in original).
180. Id. (quoting in part Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Taylor, 386 S.W.2d 868, 871
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956)) (internal quotations omitted) (“[J]udicial dictum [is] a formulation of the law deliberately made for the purpose of being followed by the trial
court. It is not simply ‘obiter dictum.’ It is at least persuasive and should be followed
unless found to be erroneous.”).
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from the evidentiary principle addressed as to render it obiter dicta. Instead, the indicated expansion (areas with similar characteristics) is
linked by or to the existing standard (the general area of the particular
collision).181 The court emphasized the force of the language noting,
“when the Legislature has spoken in such broad terms, courts should be
wary of preempting the role of the jury.”182
Given this understanding, trial courts and practitioners must carefully evaluate the potential scope of a similar characteristics test in this
context. The court made a specific choice to expand its language to include a similar characteristics analysis.183 One potential reason for the supreme court’s expressed interest in an expansion of constructive notice
under highway maintenance provisions of the Tort Claims Act is outlined
in the hypothetical below:

On the day NM 999 opens, parties depart from both Truth or
Consequences and Reserve heading to the other community. Between mile markers 44 and 45 the first two vehicles meet. Unfortunately one of the drivers is distracted by the scenery, crosses
through the center turn-only lane, and hits the other vehicle head
on. All parties involved in the accident are killed. The New Mex-
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181. Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 43 (“[E]vidence of other collisions in the general
area of the particular collision or in other areas with similar characteristics, may be
relevant to notice.”).
182. Id.
183. Quinn, supra note 179, at 714 (“[T]here is a convention that high courts do not
talk about things either favorably or unfavorably simply for the hell of it. The existence of that convention suggests that if a high court writes about something, then it
means to guide other courts and lawyers by what it has said.”).
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NMDOT, through its normal planning and design process,
builds a new road, NM 999, between Truth or Consequences and
Reserve. The road is designed and constructed to increase efficiency of travel between two communities. To achieve the goal of
reducing actual miles traveled, NM 999 winds through the forest
between the two communities and includes steep inclines and declines due to topographical conditions and elevation changes.
Concrete center barriers are installed between mile markers 40
and 50 given the winding nature of the road and the acknowledged potential for crossover collisions. NMDOT does not install
center barriers between mile markers 44 and 45 so that logging
trucks can access forest roads that previously passed through the
forest at this location from either direction. Instead of center barriers, a turn-only lane is installed to separate eastbound and westbound traffic and to facilitate turning from the road without
disrupting the flow of traffic.
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ico State Police investigate the accident and report their findings
to NMDOT.
Over the next few months, two additional crossover collisions occur between mile markers 44 and 45. The State Police notify NMDOT on each occasion. After the third collision, NMDOT
installs concrete barriers between mile markers 44 and 45 in conformance with those previously installed between mile markers 40
to 44 and 45 to 50.
After exhausting insurance remedies, each not-at-fault party
files a separate lawsuit against NMDOT. As a result of the design
immunity provisions of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, the
cause of action in each lawsuit alleges negligent maintenance of a
roadway under NMSA 1978, Section 41-4-11(A). For purposes of
this analysis, we will denote the plaintiffs chronologically as Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 2, and Plaintiff 3.
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184. Ryan v. New Mexico State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 1998-NMCA-116, ¶ 10,
125 N.M. 588, 964 P.2d 149.
185. Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 43.
186. Ryan, 1998-NMCA-116, ¶ 10.
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Under Martinez, the state has a duty to install traffic control devices
(including concrete barriers) when it has sufficient notice of a dangerous
condition exists on a roadway. Therefore, a duty to remedy the dangerous
condition on NM 999 exists once NMDOT is on notice of that dangerous
condition. How does this affect each of the three plaintiffs’ cause of action against NMDOT? To answer this question, we apply the evidentiary
standards from Ryan (“on that particular stretch of highway”)184 and Martinez (“in other areas with similar characteristics”).185
Under the Ryan standard for determining relevancy of evidence, no
evidence exists indicating that NMDOT had actual or constructive notice
of a dangerous condition between mile markers 44 and 45 at the time of
Plaintiff 1’s accident. Intuitively, evidence of notice will increase with
each subsequent accident. Plaintiff 2 will cite NMDOT’s knowledge of
Plaintiff 1’s accident. Plaintiff 3 will cite NMDOT’s knowledge of both
previous accidents. Under Ryan, Plaintiff 3’s claim that NMDOT
breached its duty to maintain the highway is strengthened by evidence
that NMDOT was on notice of a dangerous condition “on that particular
stretch of highway.”186 Plaintiff 2’s claim is marginally weaker, but may
survive summary judgment. Plaintiff 1, however, has no hope of surviving
summary judgment under the Ryan standard. No evidence exists to
demonstrate that NMDOT had notice of a dangerous condition on the
first day that NM 999 opened.
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Under the holding from Martinez, a viable cause of action potentially becomes available to Plaintiff 1. The fatal accident involving Martinez, Espinoza, and Griego187 inarguably establishes that NMDOT is on
actual notice that the absence of concrete center barriers on NM 502 created a dangerous condition within NMDOT’s jurisdiction. Just like NM
502, NM 999 winds and traverses similar topographical features and elevation changes. Simply put, NM 999 in the hypothetical problem has
“similar characteristics” to NM 502.188 Therefore, under Martinez, Plaintiff 1 can argue that NMDOT had constructive notice of a dangerous condition on NM 999 based on its actual knowledge of the dangerous
condition on NM 502.
It is worth noting that under Martinez, roadways do not have to be
newly constructed to satisfy notice requirements. Numerous accident locations may (1) have similar characteristics to other known dangerous
locations (remedied or not) on a roadway within the jurisdiction; and (2)
be the first reported accident at a specific location.
Martinez held that evidence of a governmental entity’s notice of a
dangerous condition on a roadway is admissible regardless of whether the
evidence presented relates directly to the precise location of an accident.
It may, however, do more. The supreme court’s language in Martinez is
an invitation for advocates to explore what evidence might be relevant to
establishing a governmental entity’s constructive notice of a dangerous
condition on a roadway throughout its jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
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187. Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 2–3 (decedents in Martinez).
188. Id. ¶ 43.
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With respect to a governmental entity’s duty to remediate a known
dangerous condition through the placement of traffic control devices, the
Martinez court rejected a bright-line rule that excludes safety features
based on their physical or temporal characteristics. This holding will allow
litigants to pursue previously questionable causes of action and avoid
summary judgment. With respect to a potential expansion of a governmental entity’s constructive notice of a dangerous condition, the supreme
court’s Martinez holding must be interpreted in future proceedings. If the
holding is interpreted as above, governmental entities would be advised
to evaluate safety considerations throughout their jurisdictions with a reduced dependence on design immunity provisions in the Tort Claims Act.
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